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I. INTRODUCTION

Since 1990, advertising expenditures in the United States have surpassed $130 billion per year.' As the casual consumer knows, much of
this advertising is misleading, if not blatantly false. 2 Consumers and competitors are harmed as a result?
Although individual consumers harmed by such advertising generally
have not sustained damages sufficient to justify the costs of litigation.
competitors often have.4 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act5 gives competitors a federal cause of action against rivals who engage in false or misleading advertising.6 In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in
the number of such suits brought by competitors.7 There also has been a

1.

See MARTIN MAYER, WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO MADISON AVENUE?: ADVERTISING IN THE

'90"s 219 (1991).

2. It is inevitable that some consumers will be misled by commercial advertising: Given the
time and space limitations of the various media outlets, advertising copy is necessarily incomplete.
Most advertisements contain more than one message with different meanings to different people. See
Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657, 672-76 (1985). Nevertheless, much advertising is knowingly and intentionally misleading. See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text. Such misrepresentation is not limited to the fly-by-night companies interested in a fast dollar. Established companies, particularly those selling parity products, often find it beneficial to stretch
the truth. For example, some commentators have estimated that every 1% increase in market share
created by advertising for over-the-counter drug companies increases sales by $15 million. See Ross D.
Petty, Competitor Suits Against False Advertising: Is Section 43(a) of the Lnhamn Act a Pro-Consuoner Rule or an Anticompetitive Tool?, 20 U. BALT. L. REV. 381, 388 (1991). Under such circumstances.
it is not surprising that some businesses may adopt questionable advertising strategies when their
goods cannot be distinguished by legitimate means.
3. See infra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
4. See Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising.
90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 667-69 (1977).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1992). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, now codified in
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1), provides:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for
goods. uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol. or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false
or misleading representation of fact, which(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature.
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's
goods, services, or commercial activities.
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to
be damaged by such act.
id.
6. Id.
7. See Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertiing Under Section 43(a) of the
Lainham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception. 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1992). The increase in litigation
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correlative increase in the commentary, much of it critical, discussing such
actions.
In the leading article, Professor Lillian BeVier suggests that false
advertising does not pose a systematic threat to consumer welfare, and if it
did, competitor lawsuits would not effectively provide systematic relief for
the hypothetical consumer injury.9 She maintains that in a free market

system, consumers generally have ample means to protect their interests." They may observe and compare rivals' goods before purchase and
punish false advertisers after purchase "by spreading the word about the
offending product and by not repurchasing it."" In those cases in which
consumers are not able to protect themselves through such marketplace
actions, they are unlikely to believe advertisers' claims. Under these circumstances, according to Professor BeVier, competitors have limited in-

has been the result of several factors including (1) the rise in comparative advertising after the Federal
Trade Commission's policy statement encouraging such advertising, see In Regard to Comparative Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 14.15 (1993); Cornelia Pechmann & David W. Stewart, The Effects of Comparafive Advertising on Attention, Memory, and Purchase Intentions, 17 J. CONSUMER RES. 180, 180
(1990). (2) the 1988 Trademark Law Revision Act's elimination of the requirement that defendant's
misrepresentations concern inherent characteristics of the defendant's goods and the Act's explicit
extension of § 43(a) to false disparaging comments made by the defendant about the plaintiff's goods.
see Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, tit. I, § 132, 102 Stat. 3935. 3946
(1988) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. IV 1992)); Ross D. Petty, Supplanting Governnient Regulation with Competitor Lawsuits: The Case of Controlling False Advertising, 25 IND. L.
REV. 351, 370 (1991); and (3) the growth of negative commercial advertising following the success of
such camppigns in the political sphere. see Karen E. James & Paul J. Hensel. Negative Advertising:
The Malicious Strain of Comparative Advertising, J. ADVERTISING. June 1991, at 53. 53. The continuing relevance of each of these factors suggests that the explosion in the number of competitor suits
for false advertising should not abate in the 1990s. Possible increased supervisory activity by the federal government should not reverse the trend because the FTC focuses on different types of cases from
those typically brought by private parties. See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
8. Compare BeVier, supra note 7, at 3-4 (suggesting it is unlikely that competitor lawsuits
would effectively provide relief for consumer injury); Ellen R. Jordan & Paul H. Rubin, An Economic
Analysis of the Law of False Advertising, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 527, 528 (1979) (doubting competitor's
need for any legal action premised on false advertising); Petty, supra note 2 (comparing FTC and
Lanham Act cases and questioning the Lanham Act's ability to adequately protect consumers) and
Jeffrey P. Singdahlsen. Note. The Risk of Chill: A Cost of the Standards Governing the Regulation of
False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 77 VA. L. REV. 339. 340-41 (1991) (expressing reservations about the usefulness of competitor lawsuits for false advertising) with Joseph P.
Bauer. A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should be the Reach of Section 43(a) of tle
Lanham Act?. 31 UCLA L. REV. 671. 672 (1984) (endorsing an expanded application of the Lanham
Act to protect consumers, competitors. and the competitive process); Arthur Best, Controlling False
Advertising: A ComparativeStudy of Public Regulation, Industry Self-Policing, and Private Litigation,
20 GA. L. REV. 1, 70-71 (1985) (concluding private litigation is the best process for controlling many
kinds of troublesome advertising) and Roger E. Schecter, Additional Pieces of the Deception Puzzle:
Some Reactions to Professor BeVier. 78 VA. L. REV. 57 (1992) (critiquing Professor BeVier's position).
9. See BeVier, supra note 7, at 2-3.
10. Id. at 8.
ll. Id.
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centives to make false claims.'12
It is this article's thesis that Professor BeVier and the other commentators who are critical of competitor suits for false advertising systematically
overstate the success with which the market mechanism protects against
false advertising. Both theory and empirical evidence, 3 that is, reality,
raise serious questions about many of these commentators' assumptions.
Equally important, their single-minded focus on consumer welfare fails to
accord sufficient significance to other goals of the Lanham Act. 5 For
example, the traditional tort law goal of compensating victims of
wrongdoing receives no weight. 6
Nonetheless, these commentators provide valuable contributions by
their discussion of the costs resulting from competitor lawsuits. Contrary
to the explicit or implicit assumptions of many of the writers endorsing
expanded enforcement of section 43(a), these actions are not cost-free.'
They may chill useful, informative advertising; often involve significant
litigation costs; and may produce anticompetitive results. 8 However. this
article argues that the costs enumerated by the critics of competitor false
advertising suits overstate the problems created by competitor enforcement
of section 43(a). This article also proposes amendments to the Lanham Act

12. Id. at 8-13. For a more extensive discussion of Professor BeVier's position, see infra notes
47-56 and accompanying text.
13. To test commentators' assumptions. the author reviewed and catalogued all § 43(a) cases
brought by competitors that were reported in the ten year period from April I. 1983 through April I.
1993. in which a false advertising claim was the primary ground for relief. Cases excluded from this
article's analysis include those in which (1)patent, copyright, misappropriation, trade secret, or trademark or tradename issues were the focus of the litigation, see. for example. Transgo, Inc. v.Ajac
Transmission Parts Corp.. 768 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied. 474 U.S. 1059 (1986): Otis
Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Co.. 754 F.2d 738 (7th Cir. 1985): Rickard v. Auto Publisher.
735 F.2d 450 (11th Cir. 1984); (2) the plaintiff was a noncompetitor. see. for example. Janda v. RileyMeggs Indus.. 764 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Torres v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.. No. 86-CI718.
1987 U.S. Dist LEXIS 7157 (N.D. I11.
Aug. 3. 1987); (3) the only reported opinions discuss issues
other than the substantive false advertising claim, see. for example. Nabisco Brands v. Keebler Co..
No. 91-C20115. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19159 (N.D. I11.
May 6. 1991) (discussing venue transfer):
Construction Technology v. Lockformer Co.. 704 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (discussing statute of
limitations); and (4) the decision rested on pre-1988 amendment law. see. for example. Turbosound.
Inc. v. Eastern Acoustics Works, 672 F. Supp. 575 (D. Mass. 1987); National Ass'n of Pharmaceutical
Mfrs. v. Ayerst Labs.. 1987-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,573 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Borden, Inc. v. Kraft. Inc..
224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 811 (N.D. 111.
1984); Zerpol Corp. v. DMP Corp., 561 F. Supp 404 (E.D. Pa.
1983). For a complete list of included cases, see infra app.
14. To be fair, Professor BeVier acknowledges that her analysis does not describe reality, but is
designed to offer "a testable hypothesis about the likely order of magnitude of false claims.' BeVier.
supra note 7, at 13 n.39. Nevertheless, her theory departs from reality so significantly that one must
question the validity of the assumptions underlying the theory.
15. See infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
17. See. e.g., Bauer, supra note 8. at 672. 706: Best, supra note 8. at 57.
18. See injra part V.
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that would further reduce the costs from competitor suits without sacrificing the potential benefits such suits offer.
Absolute truth in all advertisements is not desirable, much less attainable. 9 When Chun King parodies medical testimonials with an ad for its
chow mein that says, "Nine out of ten doctors recommend Chun King,"
and the visual shot shows nine Chinese doctors in a group shot with one
Caucasian doctor, little purpose would be served by enjoining the advertisement because it is literally false and a few slow consumers might be
misled. Ultimately, the critics of section 43(a) are correct that a cost-benefit analysis should be employed to design sensible false advertising
rules.2" The fault in their argument lies in the exclusion of goals other
than consumer welfare from their analysis and in the appraisal of the
consumer welfare effects of competitor actions.
Part II of this article reviews the theory of advertising, focusing on the
market effects of false advertising. Part III describes and critiques the
commentary questioning the usefulness of competitor suits for false advertising. Part IV addresses the related issue of alternatives to competitor
suits to eliminate false advertising, and concludes that although the variety
of alternative enforcement mechanisms reduce the need for competitor
actions, competitor actions provide benefits that no other policing tool
provides. Part V discusses the types and severity of costs associated with
competitor suits for false advertising. It acknowledges that although those
costs are not as severe as critics of private enforcement of section 43(a)
suggest, the costs are nonetheless real. Finally, part VI recommends two
relatively minor, albeit potentially controversial, changes to existing false
advertising law that should reduce the costs identified in part V.
II. THEORY OF ADVERTISING
Although some commentators assert that high levels of image advertising unethically manipulate consumer demand, create spuriously perceived
differences in products, and yield higher prices and entry barriers, 2' there
is little debate concerning the beneficial effects of truthful informational
advertising. Informational advertising increases buyer knowledge about the
price, quality and benefits of various products, thus reducing consumers'
search costs and the total costs to consumers of transacting business.'
Truthful informational advertising not only produces lower effective pric-

19. See Craswell, supra note 2, at 714-17.
20. See Craswell, supra note 2. at 681-88.
21.

See MARK

S.

ALBION & PAUL

W.

FARRIS. THE ADVERTISING CONTROVERSY: EVIDENCE ON

THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 31-32 (1981); BeVier, supra note 7, at 4-8.
22. See STANLEY I. ORNSTEIN, INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND ADVERTISING INTENSITY 2-3

(1977).
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es, but induces sellers to improve the quality of their goods.23 Better informed buyers are not likely to purchase inferior merchandise.2 4 Advertising may also reduce barriers to entry and improve product offerings by
allowing the new entrant to quickly gain market awareness and acceptance.2 ' For example, "Mutual fund product innovation increased dramatically, and the market share of no-load funds grew significantly, when the
Securities and Exchange Commission relaxed advertising restrictions. Cholesterol advertising led to a wave of product changes and market share
shifts that reduced consumption of dietary cholesterol. 26 Studies of the
impact of restrictions on advertising consistently confirm that advertising
improves market performance.2 ' The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
and the United States Supreme Court both recognize the benefits of truthful informational advertising. 2 Thus, policymakers must be wary not to
silence or chill truthful advertising in their enthusiasm to cleanse the marketplace of misrepresentations or fraudulent practices.
Nevertheless, if truthful informative advertising is an unequivocal
social good, false advertising is unequivocally bad. In the short run, deceptive advertising injures consumers and competitors.29 In the long run.
false advertising results in a reduction of product quality and a
misallocation of resources. If left unchecked, deceptive advertising may
30
eventually undermine the entire competitive system.
Consumers who are misled may be injured in three ways. They may
suffer physical injury, incur economic damage, or face the psychological
harm of frustrated expectations.3 For example, physical harm can occur
if a seller of over-the-counter drugs deceives consumers about the efficacy
of its product. The consumer, believing the product to be effective, may
fail to seek alternative treatment. The consumer also may be directly in-

23. Id. at 2.
24. Id.
25. See Singdahlsen, supra note 8,at 376. Comparative advertising even may aid entry by permitting "informational free-riding." That is. "by comparing its product to an established brand, a new
entrant can quickly and cheaply inform the consumer of the relevant market for its product." Id.
26. J. Howard Beales, III, What State Regulators Should Learn From FTC Experience in Regulating Advertising, 10 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 101. 102 (1991) (citations omitted).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748. 763 (1976) ("As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information,
that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political
debate."); In re National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs. No. 911-0042, 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 627 (May 20, 1993) (consent decree prohibiting professional association from restricting truthful advertising by its members); Beales, supra note 26, at 105.
29. See infra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
30. See Pitofsky, supra note 4, at 671.
31. See Roger E. Schecter. The Death of the Gullible Consumer: Towards a More Sensible Definition of Deception at the FTC, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 571. 580.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol45/iss3/3

6

Goldman: The World's Best Article on Competitor Suits for False Adverstisi
COMPETITOR SUITS FOR FALSE ADVERTISING

jured if the seller misrepresents the likelihood and severity of possible
side-effects.
Of course, the purchase of an ineffective product results in immediate
economic loss. Even if a product is effective, false advertising may cause
economic damage if consumers are induced to pay a higher price for the
product than the market would otherwise demand.32 Finally, even if a
product is effective and worth the price charged, some, including the Supreme Court and the FTC, believe that false advertising still injures the
consumer.33 They maintain that the seller's failure to deliver the bargained-for goods and the consumers' consequent frustrated expectations
constitutes real, albeit nonquantifiable, harm.'
Competitors also suffer injury from false advertising.35 In addition to
direct sales lost to the dishonest seller, an honest rival may suffer a loss in
profits if the false advertising brings the entire industry into disrepute. For
example, in W.L. Gore & Associates v. Totes, Inc.,36 Totes introduced its
TECH-TEX fabric as "the Hi-Tech Break-Through in Super-Breathable/Water Resistant Fabrics ... . the ultimate in comfortable golf rain
suit," and "seven times more breathable than GORE-TEX fabric."37 The
manufacturer of GORE-TEX brought suit under section 43(a), and the
court, after finding the defendant's claims false, concluded that consumers
dissatisfied with TECH-TEX would have no reason to purchase GORETEX when they were led to believe that TECH-TEX was the superior
product.38 Less immediate, to the extent that misled consumers become
skeptical of all advertising, competitors may have to spend more money to
truthfully educate consumers about the attributes of their goods.39
The potential long-range harms from false advertising are even more
damaging. In a competitive economy, consumer purchases determine the
mix and quantity of goods and services produced. By distorting consumer
purchasing patterns, false advertising tinkers with the basic signaling
mechanism. 0 Deceived consumers will make inappropriate choices resulting in a misallocation of resources.4 For example, if Excedrin does not
relieve headache pain fast, not only will there be many cranky consumers,

32. Id. at 581.
33. See, e.g.. F'C v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934).
34. See Schecter, supra note 31, at 582. Consumers may even experience lower self-esteem if
they perceive themselves as having been "duped." Id.
35. Id.
36. 788 F. Supp. 800, amended, 1992 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4055 (D. Del. Apr. 1. 1992).
37. Id. at 804.
38. See id. at 811.
39. Schecter. supra note 31, at 583.
40. See Beales. supra note 26, at 102: Schecter. supra note 31, at 584.
41. Beales. supra note 26, at 102; Schecter. supra note 31, at-584.
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but too much capital and labor will be employed to produce a worthless
product rather than a more effective pain reliever or some other socially
useful good. Additionally, product quality may diminish if inferior goods
can be advertised and sold as equivalent to or better than its higher priced
competition.
If consumers react by completely ignoring advertising claims, false
advertising may begin to undermine the basic workings of a competitive
marketplace.42 As explained by Professor Pitofsky, "In markets where
product claims are viewed with utter suspicion, high price is adopted as an
indication of quality, and price competition and product improvement
become economically irrational. '43 New entrants with improved or innovative products ultimately may be barred from the marketplace because
they have no effective means to communicate with the public.
Finally, false advertising may have long-term effects beyond the economy. Society's moral and ethical standards are diminished if false advertising is accepted as a standard business practice.' Lying and cheating
become increasingly acceptable as they become more prevalent.4 5 Eventually, this dishonesty may reach beyond the commercial marketplace. 6
The level of discourse in political campaigns already may reflect this
phenomenon. False advertising in the commercial arena may even impact
social or political ideals. If cars "made in America" contain mostly Japanese parts or "environmentally sound" oil companies fail to take sufficient
precautions to prevent oil spills, the deceived consumer will be unable to
accurately voice their social and political preferences through their marketplace spending.
The multitude of harms from false advertising, however, does not
necessarily demand recognition of competitor suits under section 43(a).
The advisability of competitor suits is a function of three variables: (1) the
prevalence of false advertising and the effectiveness of competitor suits for
remedying such advertising, (2) the availability of alternative means to
police the marketplace, and (3) the costs entailed by granting competitors
standing to sue for false advertising. The succeeding sections address each
of these variables.

42. Pitofsky, supra note 4,at 671.
43. Id.
44. See Schecter, supra note 31, at 584-85.
45. See id.
46. Cf. NORMAN DOUGLAS, SOUTH WIND 63 (Scholarly Press, Inc., 1971) (1925). cited in
Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.. 987 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[Y]ou can tell the ideals of a nation by its
advertisements.").
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III.

THE CRITICS' VIEW OF COMPETITOR SUITS FOR FALSE
ADVERTISING AND A RESPONSE

A. The Threat Posed by False Advertising
1. The Critics' View
Using consumer welfare as the exclusive criterion and adopting a
paradigm in which the defendants in section 43(a) actions act in good
faith, Professor BeVier, like earlier critics of private enforcement under
section 43(a), concludes that false advertising does not pose a major threat
to consumers. 47 Her argument builds upon the framework of earlier commentators defining search goods, experience goods, and credence goods
and suggests48 that the marketplace protects against deception by sellers of
such goods.
Search goods are those whose characteristics can be ascertained by
presale inspection. They include the smell of perfume, the comfort of a
pair of shoes, and the beauty of a painting.4 9 Advertising about search
goods, according to the critics of competitor suits, is unlikely to be false
because, by definition, consumers can cheaply verify search qualities before purchase.5 0 "[L]ittle purpose could be served by falsely advertising
about search qualities," and advertisers might incur the cost of lost credibility for future claims.5
Experience goods are those that must be used or consumed to be
evaluated. 2 Examples include the taste of canned tuna and the durability
of a pair of sneakers. Although the consumer can cost-effectively determine the quality of experience goods only by purchase, here too, the critics of competitor suits argue, sellers have little incentive to falsely advertise. 3 For most products, a seller depends upon repeat purchasers to remain successful. A deceived consumer is likely to withhold additional
purchases and distrust future claims by the seller.' The deceived con-

47. BeVier, supra note 7, at 2-4.
48. See, e.g., Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of
Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67. 68-69 (1973); Jordan & Rubin. supra note 8. at 529; Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information. 82 J. POL. ECON. 729, 729 (1974).
49. See BeVier, supra note 7. at 9. It is more accurate to refer to search attributes or characteristics, because any good may combine search, experience, and credence attributes. For example, although the comfort of a pair of shoes is a search quality, the shoes' durability is an experience characteristic. Nonetheless, this article follows the earlier terminology of search, experience, and credence
goods, unless otherwise specified.
50. E.g., BeVier, supra note 7, at 9; Jordan & Rubin, supra note 8, at 529.
51. BeVier, supra note 7, at 9.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 11-12.
54. See id. at 11.
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sumer also may induce family and friends to withhold purchases from the
offending seller.5 Sellers, aware of these effects of false advertising on
reputation, are unlikely to view deception as a plausible marketplace strategy. 6 Furthermore, "[c]onsumers know that self-interested advertisers
have incentives to overstate quality when their claims cannot be verified
prepurchase. Consumers, accordingly, will so discount producer-supplied
hard information about the quality of experience characteristics that producers will not invest in trying to provide it."57
Credence goods, or more likely credence services, are those that have
characteristics that cannot be evaluated by the nonexpert even after purchase and use, for example, a drug's likelihood of side effects, the healthiness of frozen dinners, and the quality of dental care." Sellers seemingly
have a great incentive to falsely advertise such goods because purchasers
will never learn of the deception. 9 Those suspicious of competitor suits,
however, argue that consumers will ignore credence claims for this reason.' Given consumer disbelief, advertisers realize that they cannot profit
by falsely advertising credence traits and therefore do not make such false
claims.6
In summary, according to Professor BeVier and her fellow critics of
competitor suits, advertisers have little incentive to falsify their product
claims.6 2 Consumers can verify claims prepurchase; disbelieve self-interested, unverified claims; and punish false advertisers by spreading the
word about the offending producer and refusing to again purchase that
seller's goods.63 These free-market consumer responses eliminate, or at
least substantially reduce, the need for competitor suits under section
43(a).
2. A Response to the Critics
This article challenges the critics' model on three grounds. The model
(1) adopts questionable basic assumptions, (2) overstates the ability of
consumers to detect and punish false advertising claims, and (3) mistakenly relies on consumer skepticism to protect against undetectable false
claims.'

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
See. e.g., id. at 11-12; Jordan & Rubin, supra note 8,at 529.
BeVier, supra note 7,at 10.
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 13.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 8.
See id.
See generally Schecter, supra note 8 (cogently presenting many of the same criticisms).
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(a) The Basic Assumptions
Professor BeVier's paradigm of a good faith defendant is naive. Empirical evidence suggests that many defendants in competitor suits for false
advertising either acted in bad faith or at least knowingly stretched the
truth." Of the sixty reported competitor cases reviewed, more than half
challenged claims by defendants acting in questionable faith.' That figure probably underestimates the number of bad faith defendants because it
is likely that a disproportionate number of settled, but unreported, cases
involved defendants who failed to act in good faith. Dishonest defendants
also were not limited to fly-by-night operators. Several nationally known
companies were found guilty of making completely unsupported claims.
For example, Totes claimed that its waterproof golf jacket "allows seven
times more air to your skin" than its competitor's.67 No test was done to
support the claim.' Alpo's declaration that its product contained the formula preferred by responding veterinarians two to one over the leading
puppy food, also lacked substantiation.69 Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp.
went one step further; it made claims previously proven false by its own
study.7"
This article also challenges the critics' adoption of consumer welfare
as the sole goal of false advertising law. The single-minded focus on
consumer welfare denigrates both the interests of competitors in being
treated fairly and receiving compensation for their injuries and the interest
of society in an ethical and moral marketplace. There is express language
in the Lanham Act supporting some of these other interests. For example,
section 45 of the Act specifically states, in part, "The intent of this chapter
is to... protect persons engaged in... commerce against unfair competi71
tion."
Courts also have recognized that the Lanham Act is designed to protect commercial interests and not merely intended to be a broad public
interest statute. Denying standing to consumers, the court in Colligan v..
65. See infra app.
66. See infra app. (listing and categorizing competitor suit cases reviewed). Admittedly, categorizing whether a defendant's claims were made in good or bad faith involves a large subjective element. With that caveat, 34 cases probably should be considered to have involved claims made in bad
faith, or at least questionable faith. See infra app. In 22 cases, all claims were arguably made in good
faith. See infra app. Five cases defied categorization because the reported opinion contained insufficient facts. See hifra app. The total of 61 exceeds the sample of 60 because one case involved an unrelated counterclaim for false advertising. See infra app.
67. Gore, 788 F. Supp. at 809-10.
68. Id. at 810.
69. Alpo Petfoods v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
70. American Rockwool v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp.. 640 F. Supp. 1411. 1439 (E.D.N.C.
1986).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
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Activities Club 2 stated, "The Act's purpose, as defined in [section] 45, is
exclusively to protect the interests of a purely commercial class against
unscrupulous commercial conduct."73 It is this focus on protection of private, rather than public interests that distinguishes the Lanham Act from
the antitrust laws to which Professor BeVier analogizes as support for an
exclusive focus on consumer welfare.74 As a business tort statute, the
Lanham Act, like tort law generally, should be concerned with placing
injured parties in the same positions in which they would have been if
there had been no violation.
Perhaps what is objectionable is not the critics' focus on consumer
welfare as the sole goal of false advertising law, but their implicit definition of consumer welfare. The critics err by refusing to give any consideration to intangible, nonquantifiable interests-a problem seemingly endemic to economic efficiency scholars. Society values ethical conduct and the
fair treatment of its members as well as compensation for victims of tortious conduct.75 Yet, these values do not enter into the calculus of the
critics of competitor actions.
(b) Consumers' Ability to Detect and Punish Falsehoods
Even if defendants are assumed to act in good faith and consumer
welfare is adopted as the sole standard by which to judge the advisability
of competitor suits for false advertising, the critics' model still fails to persuade. Although the free market has some ability to self-correct, the critics
overstate that ability and therefore grossly underestimate sellers' incentives
to falsely advertise.76 First, the critics miscalculate the ability of consumers to detect falsehoods. Many advertisements contain credence claims
which consumers do not test, even if the goods sold are search or experience goods. Comparative advertising, a form of marketing that has increased dramatically in the past two decades,77 is illustrative. Although a
72. 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
73. Id. at 692; see also Guarino v. Sun Co., 819 F. Supp. 405 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding that a gasoline consumer lacked standing to sue for false advertising under the Lanham Act because she was not
engaged in commerce). Some cases, however, have recognized that the statute also encompasses public
interest goals. See, e.g.. Camel Hair & Cashmere Inst. of America v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 799
F.2d 6, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1986).
74. See BeVier. supra note 7, at 4 n.12. In any event, not all commentators agree that the exclusive concern of the antitrust laws is consumer welfare. See. e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONONICS
AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 41 (1985); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust. 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (1979); Louis B. Schwartz, "'Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of
Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076, 1076-81 (1979).
75. If a single plaintiff wins a huge punitive damage award against a company guilty of reckless
conduct, tort law still permits other plaintiffs to seek recovery. Additional suits do not further optimal
deterrence, but they do ensure that victims are compensated for their injuries.
76. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
77. See Pechmann & Stewart, supra note 7, at 180. Comparative advertising has increased be-

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol45/iss3/3

12

Goldman: The World's Best Article on Competitor Suits for False Adverstisi
COMPETITOR SUITS FOR FALSE ADVERTISING

499

consumer theoretically could test the advertised product against the competition, the consumer frequently does not do so. Initially, the rational
consumer will not choose to purchase two identical products. After purchase and use, the consumer is either satisfied with the dishonest seller's
product, even if they would have been happier with a competitor's goods,
or the consumer assumes that if the "superior" product is not completely
satisfactory, the competitor's merchandise must be even worse.78 Thus,
the consumer may never use both or all of the compared products and
may be unable to evaluate whether the comparative advertisement was

false.
Other popular credence claims for search or experience traits include
testimonials, survey evidence, and sales or popularity statistics. A consumer may be persuaded by claims that "veterinarians prefer the formula in
' or "Christina Ferrare uses Body on Tap shampoo,"8
Alpo two to one,"79
for a variety of reasons. The purchaser may value a feeling of kinship with
the celebrity endorser" or may use such claims as a low-cost indicia of
quality.82 Yet, the consumer will likely never become aware of the truth
or falsity of any of these representations. Even advertisements for the
paradigm search trait, price, may involve influential credence claims.
Consumers may not be able to verify a seller's claim that its price is fifty
percent off or only two percent over cost. Yet; evidence suggests that
consumers value such information regardless of the level of the final market price.84 Of the sixty catalogued cases, thirty-four involved advertisecause FTC policy, beginning in the 1970s, has encouraged such advertisements. See id. In addition.
advertisers have reacted to the success of negative campaigning in the political arena. See James &
Hensel, supra note 7. at 53. Forty-three of the 60 cases catalogued, or over 70%, involved either explicit or implicit comparative claims. See infra app.
78. See, e.g., Gore, 788 F. Supp. at 811.
79. See Alpo Petfoods v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
80. See Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 274 (2d Cir. 1981).
81. See ANTHONY R. PRATKANIS & ELLIOT ARONSON. AGE OF PROPAGANDA: THE EVERYDAY
USE AND ABUSE OF PERSUASION 93 (1992).
82. The consumer may reason that the celebrity would not associate herself with a substandard
product, that the general public would not continue to purchase an inferior good, or that the seller of
lesser quality goods could not afford the additional advertising expense required to obtain survey evidence or celebrity testimonials. Cf. Nelson, supra note 48, at 745 ("The primary information content of
advertisements for experience goods is the information that the brand advertises."); Multi-Tech Sys. v.
Hayes Microcomputer Prods., 800 F. Supp. 825, 849 (D. Minn. 1992) (allowing misrepresentations regarding marketshare into evidence because of its relationship, in consumers' eyes. to the "inherent
quality of the product").
83. It is not a sufficient answer that the objective features of the falsely advertised product may
be satisfactory. If false surveys or testimonials induce consumers to purchase the dishonest seller's
goods, competition on the merits of each producer's respective product would no longer dictate marketplace success. The honest competitor may be injured, the consumer may pay more for the product
than she would have paid otherwise and a misallocation of resources may result. See Schecter, supra
note 8. at 70.
84. See Dhruv Grewal & Larry Compeau, Comparative PriceAdvertising: Informative or Decep-
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ments with claims for credence attributes." When credence claims are
defined more broadly to encompass more than just claims about objective
features of the goods, forty-eight, or eighty percent of the reported cases,
are properly classified as raising challenges to credence
claims-potentially material claims that consumers cannot cost-effectively
verify. 6
As a theoretical matter, consumer detection of false advertising,
whether of search, experience, or credence attributes, might be enhanced
by competitor counter-advertising. As the casual viewer or reader is aware,
however, few companies engage in counter-advertising. There are several
explanations. First, in markets with many sellers, the impact of counteradvertising on an individual competitor's market share cannot justify its
cost. In smaller markets, fear of mutually disadvantageous negative advertising may dissuade a firm from initiating such a program.87 In all markets, consumers simply may not believe anyone, or worse yet, may view
the honest competitor as a mudslinger and punish it accordingly.88 Counter-advertisements, particularly advertisements that critique survey methodology, are likely to be boring and ineffectual,89 and in any event, result in
an unnecessary and inefficient expenditure of resources.'
The second problem with the critics' free-market model is that deceptive advertising may be profitable and pursued by sellers even if the false
claims seem to be detectable. Some consumers who are not fully attentive
to the false advertising may only remember that the product was claimed
to be superior without remembering the reason.91 They will not discover.
and therefore not respond to, the deception. Others, already at the store,
may choose to purchase the falsely advertised goods rather than incur
additional shopping or search costs. Once a consumer is induced to buy
the seller's goods, the consumer may continue to use that brand despite
discovery of the seller's deception either because the brand's remaining attributes are satisfactory or because the consumer does not want to engage

tive?, 11 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 52, 55-56 (1992) ("[Tihe lower the selling price relative to the
internal reference price, the larger the perceived value. In other words, consumers attach value to saving money.").
85. See infra app.
86. See infra app.
87. See Pitofsky, supra note 4,at 666.
88. Given the current climate toward negative political campaigning, the risk that the counteradvertiser will be viewed as overly aggressive and have its reputation diminished is greater than ever.
89. Schecter. supra note 8,at 72 n.55.
90. Id.
91. Some might suggest that any loss suffered by such careless or inattentive consumers is deserved. That value judgment might be defensible if only the careless consumers were harmed. However, false advertising also injures innocent competitors and, by dislocating resources, all of society. See
supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
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in an additional search. As McDonald's and Holiday Inn know, consumers
value knowing the quality of what they purchase, even if the product is
not the best available on the market.
Economists might respond that even if all of the above is true, as long
as enough deceived consumers respond with hostility, sellers will not have
an incentive to falsely advertise. That is, the attentive and reactive consumers may protect everyone.92 In many situations, however, the seller
need not fear retribution by the attentive consumer and will therefore
continue to have an incentive to falsely advertise. Typically, the deceived
consumer would not have purchased the seller's product absent the false
advertising.93 The risk of losing business, which the seller would not
94
have had without the deception, should not affect the seller's incentives.
Of course, absent judicial intervention, the fly-by-night company or those
selling to nonrepeat purchasers like transients and tourists, also will not be
deterred from falsely advertising. 95
(c) The Effects of Consumer Skepticism
Finally, the critics of competitor actions underestimate the threat posed
by false advertising by overestimating the effect of consumer skepticism
on sellers' incentives. According to the critics' model, sellers will not
make false credence or experience claims because sellers realize that such
claims will be disbelieved.96 As even Professor BeVier acknowledges,
this part of the critics' model is not an accurate description of reality. 97
Businesses routinely make credence claims. Indeed, the majority of reported cases in the past ten years involved credence claims.98 Companies
would not spend millions of dollars on advertisements trumpeting consumer survey results or celebrity endorsements if the companies did not believe that such ads influence consumers." Nonverifiable claims may be

92. See George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty. 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1347
(1981); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect htfornaion: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 638 (1979).
93. Craswell. supra note 2, at 723.
94. A department store or conglomerate seller, however, may be concerned that the effects on
reputation from a discovered deception may impact sales of its other products.
95. The reported cases do not contain many instances of deception by fly-by-night companies or
businesses selling to transient consumers. However, cases against such companies probably settle or
otherwise terminate quickly, without any reported decision. In any event, with the increase in lowoverhead mail order and telemarketing sales, deception by such companies can be expected to increase
in the 1990s.
96. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
97. BeVier. supra note 7, at 13 n.39.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
99. Even if one assumes, as did Professor Nelson, that it is the amount, not the substance, of
advertising that conveys the most information to consumers, see Nelson. supra note 48, at 744-45,
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persuasive because some consumers are basically trusting individuals.
Other consumers may assume that advertisements undergo elaborate government scrutiny and would not be permitted if the ad's claims were
false.'"
False advertising may be influential even to those consumers wary of
sellers' claims. If competing goods are essentially identical, even the
slightest possibility that one seller's credence claim is true may be enough
to win the sale. In effect, consumers would face a choice analogous to
paying one dollar for product A or one dollar for both product A and a
one in a million chance of winning the lottery. The rational consumer will
choose the latter option even if it is unlikely that they will win the lottery.
In short, "wariness is hardly the same thing as disregarding advertisements
entirely."'O'
Another disturbing aspect of the critics' model is its reliance on consumer skepticism as a substitute for ridding the marketplace of lies and
misrepresentations. Moral judgments aside, by accepting universal consumer skepticism, the model restricts the market for information, or at
least requires costly additional search activity. Even honest sellers cannot
convey useful information because consumers will refuse to believe the
sellers' claims.
Given the cost of litigation and the extreme rarity of winning a damage award,' 2 competitors are unlikely to bring suit if the market will
self-correct." 3 Yet, competitors frequently file false advertising lawsuits

businesses still would be acting irrationally if they spent their advertising budget on false credence
claims. The company could purchase more advertisements and gain greater exposure by eliminating
fees for celebrities and survey takers and instead, focusing on truthful experience or search traits.
Moreover. truthful claims would not risk the cost of government prosecution.
100. See Schecter, supra note 8. at 77-78.
101. Id. at 76; cf. Best. supra note 8. at 9 (stating that on a scale of totally believable, scored as 5.
to totally unbelievable, scored as 1,the average consumer rated advertisements with credence claims
as between 2.3 and 2.4, not 1.0).
102. See infra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
103. Professor BeVier opines that a competitor may bring suit
not to stop false advertising but to
prevent comparative claims by newer rivals that get a "free-ride" on the competitor's brand name. See
BeVier, supra note 7. at 44-45. By making use of consumers' existing knowledge and past experience
concerning the competitor's brand, knowledge created by and at the expense of the competitor. comparative advertising enables the rival to economically convey information "about the nature of consumer tastes that they are positioning themselves to satisfy." Id.
Although most false advertising claims brought in the past ten years challenged comparative
ads, the empirical evidence does not support Professor BeVier's hypothesis. In only 25 of the 60 cases
catalogued did the defendant explicitly refer to the plaintiff by name. See cases cited infra app. The
defendant was a new entrant and the plaintiff a large established company in only five of those 25
cases. See infra app. Thus, in less than 9% of the reported cases in the past 10 years does Professor
BeVier's free-rider speculation provide a credible explanation for the competitor's decision to bring a
false advertising lawsuit. In any event, a competitor cannot prevent the newer rival from free-riding on
the competitor's brand: it can only stop false comparative claims.
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under section 43(a)."° The conclusion seems inescapable. The world
does not work the way the critics postulate. Rather, sellers have an incentive to falsely advertise, and the market does not self-correct. Many misrepresentations cannot be easily detected, consumers often are persuaded
by'nonverifiable claims, and discovered falsehoods do not lead inexorably

to seller punishment. Quite simply, false advertising poses a serious threat
to society.
B. The Ability of Competitor Suits to Reduce the Injuries
Caused by FalseAdvertising
Professor BeVier further argues that even if false advertising does
pose a systematic threat to consumer welfare, private suits by competitors
are unlikely to efficiently provide relief."t 5 Specifically, Professor BeVier

challenges courts' willingness to presume liability once they find that a
defendant has made a false statement of fact. Professor BeVier finds this
presumption particularly inappropriate given the difficult interpretation
issues posed by most advertising."° According to Professor BeVier, the

courts' failure to demand that a plaintiff demonstrate that a substantial
number of consumers will be deceived and that those consumers would
find the misrepresentation to be material, guarantees that competitor incen-

tives to sue are not correlated with the likelihood of consumer injury.r 7
Competitor suits, therefore, at best haphazardly further consumer welfare.
Again, Professor BeVier's focus on consumer welfare, or at least her
narrow definition of that interest, excludes consideration of other important interests.0 8 In particular, she ignores the honest competitors' interest
in compensation for their injuries"° and society's interest in an ethical
and moral marketplace." In any event, the willingness of many courts

to presume deception and materiality when a defendant has made a false
statement is easily justified. It is reasonable to presume that advertisers

104. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
105. See BeVier, supra note 7, at 3.
106. Id. at 27-3 1.
107. Id. at 3, 27-28.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
109. Competitor injury frequently will be derivative of consumer injury. However, that is not
always the case. For example, if Alpo and Purina are similarly priced identical dog foods and consumers buy Alpo based upon false claims that Alpo is preferred by veterinarians, consumers will not be
injured. They incur no physical or economic injury and because consumers will not be able to discover
the deception they do not suffer psychological injury. However. Purina will have lost a substantial
amount of sales and profits. If Purina's costs of production are lower than Alpo's, there also could be
a misallocation of resources and a classic consumer welfare loss. See Craswell, supra note 2. at 684.
110. This article does not suggest that there is a right to absolute truth, assuming absolute truth
exists. See id. at 714-17. Rather, this article demands that the interest of society in a truthful and ethical marketplace be an ingredient or factor in any consumer welfare balance.
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would not include false statements of fact unless they thought it would
have an effect on consumers. Companies do not want to buy useless advertising time or needlessly invite litigation. Correspondingly, given the
cost of litigation and the rarity of damage awards, competitors will not
often bring false advertising actions unless the challenged advertisement
had an effect on consumers."' The empirical evidence is instructive. Of
the sixty reported cases in the past ten years, only two or three involved
claims that do not seem material to the reasonable buyer.12 In only one
of those cases did the plaintiff prevail." 3 Thus, the error cost resulting
from the judicial presumption of deception and materiality appears slight.
On the other hand, the presumption benefits the parties and the court
system by avoiding potentially difficult, costly, and time consuming litigation." 4
Thus, contrary to the critics' assertions, false advertising does pose a
systematic threat to consumer welfare, and competitors' incentives to sue
are correlated with consumer injury. Whether competitor suits are a useful
means to combat false advertising, however, depends on more than those
facts. The succeeding sections address two elements that also must enter
the equation: The availability and relative effectiveness of other means to
reduce the incidence of false advertising and the costs of competitor suits.
IV. THE ALTERNATIVES TO COMPETITOR ACTIONS

Consumers, the FTC, State Attorneys General, the National Advertising Division/National Advertising Review Board (NAD/NARB),"' and
the television networks review advertising to ensure its accuracy. The
availability of so many avenues for reviewing commercial advertising
alone suggests that policymakers recognize the negative effects of false
advertising. Yet, the question remains, do we really need competitor suits
as a supplemental form of review? Although the plethora of review tribunals makes the necessity of competitor suits less immediate, none of the

11. But see supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
112. See infra app.
113. See infra app.
114. The difficult interpretation issues identified by Professor BeVier. and the resulting difficulty
in proving an advertisement true or false, do not undermine the desirability of the courts' presumption.
The only additional harm that the interpretation problem and its consequent uncertain liability introduces is the possibility that truthful claims that do not influence consumers will be silenced. Speech
that does not persuade, whether true or false, has at most, limited value to the advertiser. Although any
inappropriate injunction has its costs, see infra part V.B., the error costs result primarily from the
interpretation problem itself, not from the presumption that false statements are material.
115. The NAD/NARB is a self-regulatory system founded by major advertising associations and
the Council of Better Business Bureaus. See Gordon E. Miracle & Terence R. Nevett, Improving
NAD/NARB Self-Reguhtion of Advertising, 7 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 114, 115 (1988).
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alternative reviewing mechanisms alone or combined is a sufficient substitute for competitor suits.
Even though consumers injured by false advertising may bring suit
7
under state consumer protection statutes" 6 or the common law," consumers rarely exercise those rights. Consumer injury is usually too small
to justify hiring an attorney, much less to support individual resort to the
judicial system. Consumer class actions are uncommon because of roadblocks built by federal procedural law"' and the impracticality of maintaining a class action in many states." 9 Moreover, although competitor
injury is usually derivative of consumer injury, that is not always the
case. 20 Thus, in some cases, competitors will be injured and no consumer will have a reason to sue.'
Review of commercial advertising by the FTC provides unique benefits. Public interests, not parochial private concerns, guide FTC enforcement decisions. The FTC often pursues cases that competitors have no
incentive to bring, either because the false advertisement has little impact
on any individual competitor or because the falsity benefits the entire
industry. For example, if an individual cigarette company or an industry
association advertises that studies have proven cigarettes safe, no competitor would bring suit, yet FTC review is probable. The remedial options
available to the FTC also are more varied than those that can be pursued
by competitors."
Nevertheless, although FTC review provides a valuable service, it does
not eliminate the need for competitor actions. FTC resources are limited
and subject to the whims of Congress and each new administration."
The FTC primarily targets cases of fraud or industry-wide deception and
rarely challenges national or comparative advertising campaigns.' 24 Competitor suits fill that void."as Equally important, agency relief is often untimely. The FTC requires time to investigate a case and decide whether to
116. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 817.41 (1993).
117. Possible common-law actions for false advertising include breach of contract, breach of warranty, and fraud.
118. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin. 417 U.S. 156, 178-79 (1974) (requiring plaintiffs to
bear the cost of individual notice to each class member); Zahn v. International Paper Co.. 414 U.S.
291, 302 (1973) (requiring each individual class member to meet the amount in controversy requirement in diversity actions).
119. See Pitofsky, supra note 4, at 667-68.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 4, 35-39.
122. See Petty, supra note 7. at 365-67.
123. See, e.g., id. at 351 (reporting that FTC resources for advertising enforcement were cut 42%

from fiscal years 1978 to 1987).
124. See id. at 375, 392.
125. Section 43(a) false advertising actions most commonly challenge national comparative advertising claims. See cases cited infra app.
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seek relief. Proceedings and subsequent appeals may take years.' 26 By
the time the FTC obtains relief, the advertiser's campaign may have already ended. By contrast, a competitor can seek and obtain preliminary
injunctive relief under the Lanham Act within weeks.'
Over the past few years, state attorneys general have dramatically
increased their enforcement efforts against false advertising.'28 State enforcement, however, suffers from many of the same problems that limit
federal enforcement, as well as difficulties unique to state review. Resources are limited and too often relief is delayed. Additionally, some
states are inactive, while others pursue actions of questionable benefit.' 29
Finally, most state actions involving national advertising are resolved
through voluntary agreements, which, unlike FTC orders, do not subject
the violator to sanctions. 3 In short, state regulation does little to limit
the desirability of competitor actions.
Industry self-regulation, mostly enforced by the NAD/NARB and the
television networks, has marginally reduced the incidence of false advertising. The NAD, funded by dues advertisers and advertising agencies pay to
the Council of Better Business Bureaus,' 3' seeks voluntary compliance
from the company whose advertisement the organization finds to be misleading.' 2 If the NAD is unable to resolve a case to the advertiser's satisfaction, the case can be appealed to the NARB.' 33 If the advertiser does
not comply with the NARB order, the NARB refers the case to the
FTC.'34 Understandably, faced with the threat of government
prosecution, advertisers generally comply with the NARB's orders. 3 5
Nonetheless, as an industry funded voluntary system, consumers and competitors cannot rely upon the NAD/NARB review process to provide comprehensive relief. Industry self-regulation may be designed more to forestall government intervention than to protect consumers and honest
competitors. 36 Network review also does not significantly protect consumer welfare. Networks face a tight advertising market and are aware of
the increasing number of competitive marketing options. Few stations are

126. See Best. supra note 8, at 46-47: Petty, supra note 7, at 371.
127. See Petty, supra note 7. at 371.
128. See Beales. supra note 26, at 101.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Petty, supra note 7, at 393-94.
132. See id. at 395.
133. See id. at 394.
134. See id. at 394 n.240.
135. Id. at 394.
136. See Miracle & Nevett, supra note 115, at 114; Herbert J. Rotfeld, Power and Limitations of
Media Clearance Practices and Advertising Self-Regulation. I1 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 87
(1992).
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willing to lose revenue by rejecting questionable advertising, especially
when such advertising would likely appear on cable channels or in local
markets anyway.'37 All forms of industry self-regulation also fail to provide the broad discovery powers available to private litigants through the
judicial process.'38
Granting standing to competitors to challenge false advertising provides benefits that no other existing review mechanism can provide. Competitors often have the greatest incentive and resources to bring suit'39
and frequently are the most efficient enforcers. Competitors are knowledgeable about the kinds of products they and their rivals manufacture and
regularly perform market research. 4 Thus, competitors generally are
advertising claims
best able to judge the probable truthfulness of a rival's
4
and how consumers will perceive and react to it.' '
For example, in Grove Fresh Distributors v. New England Apple
Products Co., 42 the defendant advertised its product as "100% Florida"
orange juice. 4 The plaintiff, convinced that the defendant could not sell
pure orange juice for the price that the defendant charged, had the product
analyzed by a testing laboratory.'" In fact, the juice was adulterated with
sugar and pulpwash 4 Few other parties had the price knowledge necessary to question the defendant's claim or the motivation and resources to
have the product independently tested.
Often, a competitor's pre-existing product knowledge can save substantial investigative costs that other enforcers would incur before bringing
suit. Private actions for a preliminary injunction also provide the most
immediate relief, an especially important benefit given the limited duration
of most advertising campaigns. Most fundamentally, competitor actions are
necessary if, as this article has argued, 146 society values compensating
victims of tortious conduct and ensuring that competitors feel that the

137. Herbert J. Rotfeld et al., Self-Regulation and Television Advertising, J. ADVERTISING. 19:4, at
18, 20-21.
138. See Bruce Buchanan & Doron Goldman, Us vs. Them: The Minefield of Comparative Ads,
HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1989, at 38, 48, 50.
139. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 822 F.2d 28, 31 (6th Cir. 1987).
140. See Best. supra note 8, at 58.
141. See id.; Robert S. Saunders, Note, Replacing Skepticism: An Economic Justification For
Competitors' Actions for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 77 VA. L. REV.
563, 595 (1991). In 53 of the 60 reported cases surveyed, the plaintiff competitor was in the best position. if not the only possible party, to bring suit. See infra app. In 15 of the cases, other knowledgeable potential suitors may have existed, but in eight of those 15 cases, the other potential suitors probably had insufficient injury to justify litigation. See infra app.
142. 969 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1992).
143. Id. at 553.
144. Id. at 554.
145. Id. at 555.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
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marketplace and the judicial system have treated them fairly.
Even though competitor suits provide unduplicated benefits, it does
not guarantee that competitor suits are worth the cost, particularly given
the array of alternative policing mechanisms.' 47 The critics of competitor
actions have provided their most valuable contribution by making explicit
the variety of costs associated with competitor suits for false advertising,
costs which some of the commentators advocating an expanded reach for
48
section 43(a) have failed to acknowledge.
V. THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH COMPETITOR SUITS

There are at least three costs associated with active competitor enforcement of false advertising law: (1) the chilling of truthful, informative
advertising; (2) enforcement and error costs; and (3) the encouragement of
anticompetitive litigation raising rivals' costs and restricting market entry.
The wisdom of competitor suits depends on the seriousness of each of
these costs and the extent to which they are preventable. This article contends that although the costs created by granting competitors standing to
sue for false advertising are very real, critics of competitor actions have
exaggerated the extent of those costs. Equally important, those costs can
be reduced by the proposals suggested in part VI of this article.
A. Chilling Truthful Speech
Truthful information about goods and services increases competition in
the marketplace.149 It reduces search costs and improves the quality of
decisionmaking 50 If the threat of liability for false advertising deters
advertisers from providing truthful information, society suffers.
The problem lies in the difficulty that the judicial system, and consequently the advertiser, has in determining whether an advertisement should
be considered deceptive. To prevail in a section 43(a) false advertising
action, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's advertising claims are
either literally false or likely to mislead a substantial number of consumers. "' The advertising claims also must be "material in their effects on
buying decisions, connected with interstate commerce, and actually or
likely injurious to the plaintiff."'' 12 Complications arise because an adver147. See supra text accompanying note 115 (listing several alternative policing mechanisms).
148. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 8. at 706.
149. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
151. See Castrol, Inc. v. Quaker State Corp., 977 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1992); Sandoz
Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 228-29 (3d Cir. 1990); Coca-Cola Co.
v. Tropicana Prods., 690 F.2d 312, 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
152. Alpo Petfoods v. Ralston Purina Co, 913 F.2d 958. 963-64 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Courts presume
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tisement, or even a single phrase in an advertisement, may be interpreted
by different consumers, or even the same consumer, in different ways.'53
Additionally, the "not insubstantial number of consumers" requirement for
implied deception is not self-defining," and courts have not agreed on
the proper standard to judge literal truthfulness or to determine the validity
of studies claiming to reveal either consumer reactions or the truthfulness
of challenged claims.'I
The uncertain results of section 43(a) litigation can chill the production of truthful advertising. Rather than face possible damages, an injunction, or even unnecessary litigation costs, an advertiser may prefer to
modify or eliminate its advertising campaign. Comparative advertising, the
most frequent target of section 43(a) actions, may be especially prone to
this effect.'56 Because comparative advertising is unusually informative,
the risk of chilling this information is a matter of considerable concern.
McNeil-P.C.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. is illustrative.'57 In
McNeil, the plaintiff challenged the defendant's claim that "Aspirin-Free
Excedrin relieves pain better than Extra-Strength Tylenol."' 58 Although
the defendant's studies arguably supported its claims, the lower court
enjoined the advertising campaign, finding that the study was not properly

materiality if the misrepresentation concerns an inherent quality or characteristic of the product, see
Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prods. v. Augustine Medical. 800 F. Supp. 1549, 1558 (S.D. Ohio 1992), and
harm if the false advertisement makes a comparison between competing products. See American Express Travel Related Serv. Co. v. Mastercard Int'l, 776 F. Supp. 787. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Thus. most
litigation focuses on the proper interpretation of the challenged ad and proof of falsity and deception.
For damages, a plaintiff must demonstrate actual, not merely likely, deception and injury. See infra
note 197.
153. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson*Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Smithkline Beecham
Corp.. 960 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that the defendant-advertiser's truthful list of ingredients
for competitors' antacids may imply that the competitors' antacids are unsafe because they contain
aluminum or not as healthy because they do not provide calcium like TUMS); Gillette Co. v.
Wilkinson Sword, No. 89 Civ. 3586, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8276, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1989)
(stating that the defendant advertiser's claim that its razor strip is six times smoother may imply that
the actual strip is smoother or that the resulting shave is closer, or something else entirely); Craswell,
supra note 2, at 672-76.
154. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer
Pharmaceuticals Co., No. 91-7099, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1016. at *34-35 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 1993);
Singdahlsen. supra note 8. at 356-57.
155. See, e.g., Smithkline, 960 F.2d at 300 (finding insufficient proof of implied deception because
a consumer survey, although suggesting consumers were misled, was improperly conducted): Sandoz
Phamiaceuticals,902 F.2d at 225 n.5 (discussing whether disease-state or cough-induced studies are
the best measure of cough medicine effectiveness), Alpo Petfoods. 913 F.2d at 960-62 (finding that an
ambiguous study insufficiently supported the defendant's claim that its product lessened the severity of
canine hip dysplasia).
156. See Schecter, supra note 8, at 81.
157. 938 F.2d 1544 (2d Cir. 1991).
158. Id. at 1545.
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conducted.'59 The court of appeals, acknowledging that the study's validity was "a close factual question," affirmed."6 A similarly situated future
advertiser rationally may choose to make "soft claims"'' about its product, rather than rely on a factfinder's judgment about the validity of the
advertiser's supporting studies. 62 The resulting loss to the public of information about the effectiveness of drug products not only threatens economic injury, but also raises health risks.
Postjudgment effects from active competitor enforcement of false
advertising laws also may remove truthful information from the marketplace. Compliance with any injunctive order rarely can be immediate.
During the time necessary to rethink and reshoot its advertising campaign,
the defendant may be unable to effectively communicate the merits of its
product to the public. Some commentators also suggest that the modified
advertisement may create a state of information overload, which effectively results in less, rather than more, information reaching the consumer.'63
Nevertheless, the risk of chilling truthful advertising, although real,
may be smaller than first appears. A court's injunction prohibits only false
claims, not all advertising, and the advertiser can eliminate much false
advertising without disturbing truthful speech. Contrary to Professor
BeVier's assumption, not all advertisers act in good faith.'" In the case
of blatant falsehoods,'65 uncertainty and a resulting chilling of speech
should not be a major problem. Advertisers should know to refrain from
making outright lies. Seemingly more innocent advertisers also should not
face chilling uncertainty. Advertisers are professionals who make their
livings by knowing the effect that word choice has on consumer perceptions. Often, ambiguities or misleading messages are deliberate, even if not
blatantly untrue."6 Advertisers engaging in deliberate deception, like

159. Id. at 1545-46.
160. Id. at 1551.
161. "Soft claims" are claims with limited informational value. See Nelson. supra note 48. at 745.
162. See Richard M. Schmidt. Jr. & Robert C. Bums. Proof or Consequences: False Advertising
and the Doctrine of Commercial Speech. 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1273. 1293 (1987-88).
163. Although subsequent studies have cast doubt on the information overload theory, those studies were conducted in a high involvement experimental environment. Craswell, supra note 2. at 690.
In situations in which there is low consumer attentiveness, the theory may have merit. Id.
164. BeVier, supra note 7. at 8; see supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
165. See, e.g., Grove Fresh Distribs.. 969 F.2d at 554-55 (finding that the defendant labeled juice
adulterated with sugar and pulpwash as "100% Florida" orange juice); Genderm Corp. v. Biozone
Labs., No. 92 C 2533, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13521, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 1992) (Finding that the
defendant falsely labeled a drug as containing capsaicin and stated a product effectiveness claim based
on results of tests done on a different product); Gore, 788 F. Supp. at 805 (finding a complete lack of
support for the defendant's claim that its product allows "seven times more air and sweat vapor to
pass through" than the competition's product).
166. See, e.g., Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.. 987 F.2d 939. 940 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that the
defendant based its claims of viscosity breakdown on a test known not to be the industry standard):
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those disseminating blatant falsehoods, should not be surprised by a challenge to their advertising. Equally important, experiments suggest that
ambiguous or deliberately misleading copy can be easily rewritten to pre-

vent deception without sacrificing truthful information. 67

The risk of chilling effects caused by competitor suits for false advertising may be overstated even in the case of the completely innocent advertiser. As First Amendment law recognizes, commercial speech is more

durable than other forms of speech.' 68 Many advertising claims can be
objectively measured allowing the prospective defendant to know the

truthfulness of its claims.'69 Moreover, the competitor has the economic
incentive to speak rather than remain silent. 70 Given the benefit of ad-

vertising to the competitor and the rarity of damages in section 43(a) actions,' the cost-benefit calculus for the commercial advertiser seems to
make its speech especially resistant to chilling effects.' Even if a particular advertiser is risk averse and unusually susceptible to having its
speech chilled, the threat of FTC. consumer, or state attorney general

actions may already silence it. The possibility of a competitor's suit under
section 43(a) may only have marginal effects, at least outside the compara-

tive advertising context.
Finally, even if competitor suits for false advertising chill some truthful speech, competitor suits still should result in a net improvement in the

market for information. Competitor suits may increase consumer trust and
improve sellers' ability to communicate the attributes of its products.'

Rhone-Poulenc. 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1016, at *6-7 (stating that the defendant used an acid neutralizing rating that the FDA and the defendant's own expert did not view as necessarily indicating effectiveness); Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co.. 971 F.2d 6, 13-14 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding a misleading use of a term of art despite a warning by the World Health Organization); Gillette, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8276, at *6 (stating that the defendant's studies, conducted before its razor commercial aired.
indicated that a substantial number of consumers were misled, yet the defendant still ran the advertisement unchanged).
167. See Ivan Preston & Jef Richards, The Costs of Prohibiting Deceptive Advertising-Are They
as Substantial as Economic Analysis Implies?. 16 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 209 (1989).
168. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6
(1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772
n.24 (1976).
169. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
170. Id.
171. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
172. Advertisers, however. may change the content of their ads to avoid increased risk of liability.
See supra text accompanying note 167. Admittedly, that change may be nearly as injurious to consumer welfare as the complete chilling of the advertiser's speech. See Singdahlsen, supra note 8. at 38283.
173. See Craswell, supra note 2. at 695-96. The possibility remains that consumers, aware of the
potential for competitor enforcement, may become too trusting of advertiser's claims. In that event.
competitor suits actually may increase consumer deception. Nevertheless, no evidence exists that this
would be the likely result of increased competitor enforcement of the false advertising laws.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 3
FLORIDA LA IV REVIEW

[Vol. 45

If consumers view seller claims with skepticism, the seller may be unable
to effectively disseminate information, whether truthful or not. In any
event, the deterrent effect that competitor suits have on future false advertising may more than offset any reduction in truthful speech created by
such suits.
B. Enforcement and Error Costs
Possible chilling effects aside, competitor enforcement of section 43(a)
is hardly cost-free. False advertising litigation often demands substantial
time and expense. Given the requirement of consumer surveys in implied
falsehood cases 74 and the difficulty of proving injury if damages are
claimed,'75 federal discovery may be very broad and the trial very
lengthy.
Just as ex-ante uncertainty creates a chilling effect, ex-poste uncertainty results in possible error costs. Specifically, it is possible that an injunction will be improperly issued when the advertisement does not deceive
consumers. Injunctive relief, even if appropriate, may result in a waste of
economic resources. To comply with a judicial order, the defendant may
have to rethink or reshoot its advertising campaign. Those costs often are
considerable 76 and may not outweigh the benefit produced by the injunctive decree.
The existence of enforcement and error costs in competitor suits for
false advertising is undeniable. The inevitability of such costs in all litigation, however, makes error and enforcement costs a less than persuasive
reason to criticize competitor actions under section 43(a). Moreover, such
costs may be less for competitor false advertising suits than for other legal
claims. Many false advertising cases are decided at the preliminary injunction hearing. Because courts rarely grant damages'7 7 and the advertiser's
campaign may end naturally before trial is complete, plaintiffs frequently
choose not to pursue cases through trial on the merits.' Thus, the litigation costs for false advertising suits are significantly less than might be
anticipated.
Error costs also are not as great as critics of competitor enforcement
174. See, e.g., Smnithkline, 960 F.2d at 298: Sandoz Pharnaceuticals, 902 F.2d at 228-29.
175. See supra note 152.
176. Borden. Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 811, 823 (N.D. III. 1984) (stating that the
defendant's "five ounces of milk in every slice of cheese" campaign cost over nine million dollars);
see also Beales, supra note 26, at 112 n.14 (stating that the average cost of producing a television
commercial, pre-1990, was $168,000).
177. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
178. See Best, supra note 8, at 32. The preliminary injunction decision was the last reported opinion for 27 of the 60 reported cases surveyed. Another five cases were dismissed before trial. See infra
app.
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suggest. Their estimates are based upon the assumption that defendants
typically act in good faith and face uncertain liability. As already indicated, this often is not the case.'79 Furthermore, some courts are already
sensitive to the costs imposed by their decrees' and the law can encourage other courts to similarly consider compliance costs when shaping
relief. Finally, the recommendations discussed in part VI can reduce whatever costs remain.
C. Anticompetitive Effects
Several commentators also have argued that competitor suits may
restrict market entry by new competitors.'' New entrants may need to
advertise more than established firms and are more likely to engage in
comparative advertising.' Comparative claims, however, are most likely
to invite a legal response. The resulting litigation expenses may
disproportionately increase the entrant's costs 83 and potentially deter future entry.
Despite the possible theoretical appeal of the critics' arguments, competitor enforcement of section 43(a) does not raise significant competitive
concerns. Certainly, litigation costs arising from an established rival's false
advertising claim may harm new entrants. However, new entrants are no
more entitled to compete through false claims than any other company.
Competitor enforcement should be deemed anticompetitive only in those
cases in which the established plaintiff's claim against the new entrant
lacks merit. Few cases satisfy that condition. Only twelve of the sixty
reported cases catalogued were filed by established plaintiffs against a new
entrant." Of those cases, the defendant prevailed in only two, or less
than four percent of the cases studied.'85 Moreover, even if competitors
were precluded from bringing false advertising claims, established com-

179. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
180. See, e.g., American Home Prods. Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 522 F. Supp. 1035, 1046-47
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
181. See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 7, at34; Jordan & Rubin, supra note 8, at 540, 548-49; Petty,
supra note 7, at 407-11; Singdahlsen, supra note 8, at 394.
182. See Pechmann & Stewart, supra note 7, at 188. Experimental evidence suggests that direct
comparative claims are most effective for low share brands. See id. Comparative claims allow new
entrants to economically inform consumers of the entrant's target market. Id. By contrast, comparative
claims by market leaders do not attract additional attention. may increase awareness of the comparison
brand and are more likely to create sponsor misidentification. Id.
183. Although both the new entrant and the established competitor will incur litigation costs, the
established firm is able to spread those costs over a greater number of units. Additionally, if comparative claihms are deterred, new entrants will have to spend more on advertising to inform the public of
the merits of its product.
184. See infra app.
185. See infra app.
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panies could raise rivals' costs by filing other nonmeritorious allegations.'86 In the false advertising context, as elsewhere, the law should
rely on antitrust actions' 87 or attorneys' fees awards to deter harassing,
anticompetitive litigation.'88 It should not restrict all parties' access to
the judicial system.
Although the chilling effects of competitor suits may not be as great
as first appears, they are not insubstantial. Enforcement and error costs
also must be acknowledged, particularly given the variety of alternative
methods of policing false advertising. The possibility of anticompetitive
use of section 43(a), although remote, does exist. Nevertheless, this article
suggests that these costs are less than some commentators indicate and do
not outweigh the benefits of competitor enforcement under section 43(a).
However, consumer welfare could be improved further if such costs can
be effectively reduced. The proposals recommended in part VI are designed, in part, to achieve this goal.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

This article recommends two proposals to reduce the costs attendant to
competitor lawsuits: (1) All prevailing parties should recover attorneys'
fees, at least absent exceptional circumstances, and (2) courts, following
FTC practice, should be permitted to find implied falsity without consideration of consumer surveys. The first proposal should decrease uncertainty.
lower litigation costs and eliminate the threat of harassing filings. The
proposal also provides some semblance of compensation to victims of
false advertising who are unable to meet the high evidentiary standard
required for recovery of damages. The second recommendation will lower
litigation costs. Most commentators recommend that the courts strictly
enforce the requirement of survey evidence, arguing that its elimination
would increase uncertainty and chilling effects.'89 This article contends,
however, that these increases are largely illusory.

186. Indeed, other claims would be more likely to present anticompetitive concerns. A § 43(a)
action typically results only in an injunction against the offending advertisement. See supra note 178.
Thus, the new entrant will not face a potentially bankrupting damage award, but only must terminate
or change the challenged ad.
187. See James D. Hurwitz. Abuse of Government Processes, the First Amendment, and the
Boundaries of Noerr, 74 GEO. L.J. 65, 93-109 (1985) (discussing the antitrust claim for "sham litigation").
188. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1988) (permitting the award of attorneys' fees in Lanham Act cases
under exceptional circumstances); FED. R. Civ. P. 11; infra part VI.
189. See. e.g., Best, supra note 8. at 34-35: Craswell, supra note 2. at 677 n.59. 682; Ernest
Gellhom, Proof of Consumer Deception Before the Federal Trade Commission, 17 KAN. L. REV. 559.
564-67 (1969); Singdahlsen. supra note 8. at 347-54.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol45/iss3/3

28

Goldman: The World's Best Article on Competitor Suits for False Adverstisi
COMPETITOR SUITS FOR FALSE ADVERTISING

A. Awarding Attorneys' Fees
Under existing law, a prevailing party can recover attorneys' fees only
in "exceptional cases."'" The courts have interpreted this provision as
requiring fraudulent, malicious, deliberate, or willful conduct. 9' Purposeful actions are not enough. To receive attorneys' fees, a movant must
show that the losing party acted in bad faith. 92
There are several justifications for the American Rule requiring each
litigant to pay its own attorneys' fees. Each justification, albeit reasonable
in some contexts, seems weak or inapplicable in the case of competitor
suits for false advertising. The English "fee shifting" rule is clearly preferable for false advertising cases.
The primary argument in favor of the American Rule is that a " 'loser
pays' rule deters risk-adverse plaintiffs from pursuing meritorious claims,
especially against rich defendants who can afford expensive counsel."'9
Although this concern may be valid for tort or consumer actions, in section 43(a) litigation, which is typically between large, well-funded corporations, it is inapposite. Similarly, the fear that a fee shifting rule would
deprive plaintiffs of contingent fee representation has little application to
competitor suits for false advertising. Businesses usually do not engage
counsel on a contingent fee basis. Given the rarity of damage awards,' 94
contingent fee representation is especially unlikely in competitor false
advertising suits. Even if contingent fee representation was more common,
a fee shifting rule would not deprive plaintiffs of the opportunity to hire
counsel on a contingency basis. Counsel could charge a higher percentage
contingent fee and agree to pay the opposition's attorneys' fees if the opposition prevailed.'
Some may view a fee shifting rule as being inefficient. It introduces
litigation over the amount of fees- litigation that may be unnecessary if

190. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1988).
191. See, e.g., Gillette Co. v. Wilkinson Sword, 89 Civ. 3586, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1265, at
*23 (Jan. 31, 1992) (citing S. REP. No. 1400, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7132, 7133); Cuisinarts, Inc. v. Robot-Coupe Int'l Corp., 580 F. Supp. 634, 640
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting S. REP. No. 1400, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7132, 7135).
192. See Alpo Petfoods v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958. 971 (D.C. Cir. 1990): Tambrands.
Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co.. 673 F. Supp. 1190. 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
193. Bradley Smith. Note. Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Riles and Contingency Fees: Their Impact
on Settlement hcentives, 90 MICH. L. REv. 2154, 2155 (1992): see also Fleisehman Distilling Corp. v.
Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
194. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
195. At some point, the increase in the contingency fee might have to be so large that no plaintiff
would choose to bring suit or no counsel would offer to take the case. However, that would generally
occur when the plaintiffs claim appeared nonmeritorious. In that event, deterring the filing of such a
suit would be a benefit of the proposal, not a disadvantage.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

damage awards tacitly incorporate that expense. Admittedly, fee litigation
is an additional cost. However, courts have become increasingly experienced with fee determinations and fee issues are no longer litigation intensive. Certainly, there is no reason to believe that fee litigation in section
43(a) actions would be any more difficult than for antitrust or civil rights
cases where some form of fee shifting has been adopted.' Moreover,
contrary to civil rights or antitrust cases, plaintiffs rarely win damages in
false advertising cases.'97 An attorneys' fee award would not duplicate
an amount tacitly included in a damage verdict and might, at least partially, make victims of false advertising whole.
Critics also may object that a fee shifting rule is unfair to the losing
party when a good faith dispute exists. A defeated party may have been
reasonable and justified in pursuing litigation, even if ultimately unsuccessful. As suggested earlier, however, many false advertising cases do not
involve a good faith defendant.' In those cases that do, someone must
bear the costs of trial. Given their respective equities, it seems appropriate
to have the losing party bear that expense, particularly given the difficulty
plaintiffs face in proving damages. The attorneys' fee award often will be
the plaintiff's only recovery. Moreover, a fee shifting system probably
even benefits the good faith defendant. The risk of an award of attorneys'
fees should discourage plaintiffs from bringing doubtful cases which
disproportionately involve good faith defendants. If the policymaker is still
concerned that a fee shifting rule will deter a party from pursuing an important or novel good faith claim or defense, the policymaker can modify
the English Rule to allow the court to deny fees in exceptional circumstances. 199
Compared to the American Rule, a fee shifting system increases the
stakes of litigation and may encourage increased trial costs. The greater

196. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988) (antitrust); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1992) (civil rights).
197. See. e.g., BeVier. supra note 7. at 16-17: Craswell, supra note 2. at 701: Petty. supra note 7,
at 358; infra note 202 and accompanying text. For damages, a plaintiff must demonstrate actual, not
merely likely, deception and injury. See. e.g., U.S. Healthcare v. Blue Cross. 898 F.2d 914. 922 (3d
Cir.), ceri. denied. 498 U.S. 816 (1990). The "actual deception and injury" standard has proven exceedingly difficult to meet. In some cases, plaintiffs are unable to show harm because sales have increased despite the rival's false advertising. In other cases, the plaintiff cannot establish that the false
advertising, rather than the defendant's recent entry or increased advertising budget, has cost the plaintiff sales. Thus, courts have awarded damages in only five reported decisions during the past ten years.
See hifra note 202.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
199. This modified English Rule would effectively reverse the presumption existing under current
law. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1988). Attorneys' fees would be presumptively recoverable, rather than
nonrecoverable in the absence of exceptional circumstances. If the policymaker anticipates that few
cases with exceptional circumstances will arise, a mandatory fee provision may be preferable. A mandatory provision would avoid time-consuming, case-by-case litigation regarding whether exceptional
circumstances exist.
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the stakes, the more likely parties will incur incremental attorneys' fees.
This is especially true when the party is aware that they may not be responsible for the fees if they prevail.2" Nevertheless, net trial costs may
decrease under a fee shifting rule because fee shifting can encourage settlement."0 ' With an increased stake and possibly higher trial costs, settlement promises greater savings, particularly for the risk averse. Most importantly, fee shifting would discourage nonmeritorious litigation, lowering
net costs to the judicial system and the parties. That savings might be
enhanced if a plaintiff who unsuccessfully seeks damages is not considered a prevailing party. Such a rule might be justified to discourage what
are generally fruitless claims for damages. Of the sixty cases catalogued,
plaintiffs sought damages in twenty-four cases, but received awards in
only five. 0" Creating a disincentive to such claims could eliminate unnecessary trial costs and messy discovery fights.0 3

Not only do the customary rationales for the American Rule fail to
justify the Rule in the context of competitor suits for false advertising, but
affirmative benefits to fee shifting in competitor false advertising litigation
exist as well. In a regime in which damages are rarely granted and compensation of innocent victims of misconduct is valued, awards of
attorneys' fees will come closer to making injured parties whole.2 More

200. One commentator has raised a related criticism of the fee shifting rule. Professor Wolfram
suggests that the English Rule may create an unseemly divergence of interest between the attorney and
client. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Second Set of Players: Lawyers, Fee Shifting, and the Limits of
Professional Discipline. 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 319-20 (1984). Although fee shifting can
create ethical conflicts, such conflicts exist under any payment rule. For example, a lawyer charging an
hourly rate has a personal economic incentive to increase billings rather than settle. Ultimately, one
relies on attorneys to act ethically and follow the Code of Professional Responsibility. See MODEL
CODE PROFESSIONAL OF RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (1980). Moreover, the apparent conflict probably is
less severe in the case of competitor suits than in many other types of actions. Section 43(a) suits typically involve sophisticated commercial enterprises. Unlike cases brought by individuals, such corporate
parties generally maintain greater control over litigation decisions. If the sophisticated client exercises
control over the litigation process, the attorneys' apparent conflict becomes moot.
201. See Smith, supra note 193. at 2161-62. But see Steven Shavell. Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A
Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, I1 J. LEG. STUD.
55, 65-66 (1982) (stating that a fee shifting rule produces a lower settlement rate when parties' expected judgments are equal).
202. See infra app. In two of the five cases, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case
for a redetermination of the appropriate damage award. See Alpo Petfoods v. Ralston Purina Co., 913
F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1990); PPX Enters. v. Audiofidelity Enters., 818 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1987).
203. This article recommends against completely eliminating damage claims. Damage actions are a
necessary deterrent to bad faith advertisers. In the absence of potential damage awards, unscrupulous
businesses would view false advertising as a worthwhile investment. The advertiser would benefit in
the interim until the plaintiff filed suit, would face no threat of a damage award, and often would have
voluntarily changed its campaign by the time the court issued an injunction. This article also recognizes compensation of innocent victims of false advertising as a worthy goal. See supra notes 72-74
and accompanying text.
204. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview.
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importantly, a fee shifting rule creates an incentive scheme that promotes
consumer welfare. An attorneys' fee award to the prevailing party encourages filing of meritorious claims and discourages companies from bringing
unworthy or harassing lawsuits." 5 Because the Lanham Act is at least
partially endowed with protecting the public's interest, encouraging "private attorneys general" to enforce false advertising laws is sound policy.
Competitors often are in the best position to detect deceptive advertising,
and the fee incentive may be especially important to them. Businesses
typically evaluate options by their bottom line effect. Currently, plaintiffs
in section 43(a) actions cannot expect to win damage awards." ° Thus,
without the fee incentive, many meritorious cases may not be brought.
Attorneys' fee awards also reduce many of the costs associated with
competitor actions. By discouraging the most marginal cases and increasing the number of cases challenging clear wrongdoing, a fee shifting rule
removes some of the uncertainty inherent in section 43(a) prosecutions.
The advertiser can feel safer making good faith claims and knows that bad
faith claims are likely to be challenged. This results both in a decrease in
chilling effects and an increase in general deterrence. To the extent that
27
critics are concerned that competitor suits have anticompetitive effects,
a fee shifting rule directly addresses that concern. Harassing lawsuits
brought to increase rivals' costs obviously are discouraged if the plaintiff
would have to pay the prevailing defendant's attorneys' fees.
Finally, a fee shifting rule should reduce error and enforcement costs.
By increasing the proportion of meritorious to nonmeritorious actions
brought, fewer cases in which courts mistakenly enjoin truthful advertisements should result. Litigation costs also should decrease. With more
meritorious claims and clearer liability, fewer difficult issues should arise.
If damage claims are discouraged, costs will further decrease. 2" A fee
shifting rule also may result in less trial time if the incentive for settlement increases. 2°
Adoption of this article's proposal would not force the law to embark
on unchartered waters. In Germany, competitors can privately enforce
false advertising law, and attorneys' fees are awarded to the prevailing
party. The experience there has been positive. 2 " Attorneys' fees are

1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 657; Smith, supra note 193, at 2154-55.
205. See Shavell. supra note 201. at 59. Technically, it is not the merits of the lawsuit that is
critical, but the plaintiff's view of the suit's merits. Given that the more worthy the claim, the higher
the plaintiff's evaluation of the case. this distinction should not affect the analysis in the text.
206. See supra note 202 and accompanying text (discussing the rarity of damage awards).
207. See supra notes 181-88 and accompanying text.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 202-03.
209. See supra text accompanying note 201.
210. Warren S. Grimes. Control of Advertising iz the United States and Germany: Volkswagen

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol45/iss3/3

32

Goldman: The World's Best Article on Competitor Suits for False Adverstisi
COMPETITOR SUITS FOR FALSE ADVERTISING

awarded in antitrust and civil rights cases. There is no reason similar
awards cannot be made in Lanham Act false advertising suits.
B. Reduced Reliance on Consumer Surveys
This article's second proposal, permitting courts to forego use of consumer surveys when interpreting an advertisement's message, is a more
modest, but highly controversial, idea. Unlike the fee shifting proposal,
reduced reliance on consumer surveys does not have unequivocally positive effects on the costs associated with competitor enforcement of section
43(a). Rather, reduced reliance on consumer surveys will lower some
costs, but potentially raise others. However, -this article concludes that the
positive effects will dominate and result in a net benefit to society.
Under current law, to prevail on a claim alleging implied misrepresentation, a plaintiff is virtually required to present a carefully designed and
conducted consumer survey. ' The survey requires considerable time
and expert expenses that are not reimbursable as part of an award of
costs." 2 Surveys also inevitably trigger substantial and costly litigation
about their validity." 3 If surveys invariably led to more accurate
decisionmaking, the increased accuracy might justify the cost. However,
the survey is often unnecessary and sometimes counterproductive.
In many instances, the court, or any objective reader, can determine
whether an advertisement makes the implied claim challenged. For example, in Rhone-Poulenc, the defendant advertised its product, Extra Strength
Maalox Plus (Maalox), as "the strongest antacid there is. 21 4 The plaintiff
alleged that this claim falsely implied that Maalox was the most effective
antacid on the market. 1 5 It is difficult to imagine why the defendant
would make the challenged claim if not to convey that Maalox offered

Has a Better Idea, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1769, 1769-70, 1800 (1971).
211. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 14 (7th Cir. 1992); Sandoz
Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks. Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 229 (3d Cir. 1990); Avis Rent A Car
Sys. v. Hertz Corp., 782 F.2d 381, 386 (2d Cir. 1986); Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer
Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharmaceuticals Co.. No. 91-7099. 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1016, at *27 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 1993) (stating that "the success of the claim usually turns on
the persuasiveness of a consumer survey").
212. See, e.g., Gillette Co. v. Wilkinson Sword, No. 89 CV 3586, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1265, at
*32-33 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 1992).
213. See infra notes 215-21, 224-25 and accompanying text.
214. Rhone-Poulenc, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1016, at *3.
215. Id. Although the advertisement appears to be challengable as literally false, the claim was
supported by laboratory tests indicating that Maalox had the highest acid neutralizing capacity (ANC)
rating. Id. at *6. However, all experts stated and the court found that the ANC test does not measure
antacid effectiveness. Id. at *7.The FDA also excluded ANC ratings from product labels fearing unwarranted consumer reliance on such information. Id. at *6. Hence, the plaintiff filed the implied falsehood claim.
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superior relief. Yet, the court required the plaintiff to present survey or
substitute evidence proving consumer perceptions of the advertisement. In
cases like Rhone-Poulenc, it is inefficient to require the plaintiff to conduct a proper consumer survey to prove the obvious.2 6 Worse, if the
plaintiff neglects to present a suitable survey, the court must either reach a
questionable resultf2 7 or disingenuously find that the implied message is
really a literal falsehood." 8 The decision in Rhone-Poulenc is illustrative.
Despite percentages suggesting that a substantial number of consumers extracted the seemingly obvious misleading message, the court refused to
grant relief because it found that the surveys presented were not sufficiently objective. 2"9
The threat of inappropriate decisions may be compounded by the
inability of parties to complete an adequate consumer survey in time for
the preliminary injunction hearing.22 ° Erroneous rulings at that critical
stage of the litigation process often are irreversible. 22' Thus, the survey
requirement certainly increases litigation costs and may even increase error
costs.
Nevertheless, the pivotal question in false advertising litigation is how
consumers react to a challenged advertisement.2 Undeniably, a properly
216. See Gillette. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 1265 (requiring a survey to prove that consumers
interpreted the claim that Wilkinson's blade strip is six times smoother than Gillette's to mean that
Wilkinson's razor would give a smoother shave); Playskool, Inc. v. Product Dev. Group, 699 F. Supp.
1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (requiring a survey to prove that consumers interpreted the defendant's claim
that its product could be used in conjunction with the plaintiff's goods to mean that consumers could
use the products and goods together safely and without additional equipment). Courts should not need
survey evidence to prove that a "strongest antacid" claim communicates superior effectiveness anymore than it is necessary to demand consumer reaction tests to show that the public does not really
believe that "Exxon puts a tiger in your tank." Fear of judicial activism should not justify a presumption of complete judicial incompetence.
217. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Smithkline Beecham
Corp., 960 F.2d 294, 299-300 (2d Cir. 1992) (admitting that the advertisement played upon
consumers' misperceptions about the effects of aluminum in antacids and that survey figures suggested
that consumers were misled, but denying relief because the court found that the survey was improperly
conducted): Gillette. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1265. at *1 (denying preliminary relief based upon lack
of authentication for a consumer survey supporting the allegation that the six times smoother claim
implies a smoother shave, but granting a permanent injunction after trial on the merits).
218. See. e.g., Abbott Labs.. 971 F.2d at 9-11 (finding that the "Ricelyte" name expressly imparted
the message that the product contained nonhydrolyzed rice carbohydrates, not merely rice syrup solids); Tambrands, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 673 F. Supp. 1190, 1193-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding
the claim that a pregnancy test would produce results "in as fast as ten minutes" literally false because
only some women got results in just ten minutes); BeVier. supra note 7, at 29. Alternatively, some
courts seem to rely on their personal reading of an advertisement to decide survey issues. See. e.g..
Tanibrands,673 F. Supp. at 1194. Thus. the survey requirement becomes little more than an expensive
sham.
219. Rhone-Poulenc. 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1016. at *33-35.
220. See. e.g., Abbott Labs., 971 F.2d at 16: E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Stuart Pharmaceuticals. No.
90-1178, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15788, at *47 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 1990).
221. See supra part V.B.
222. See. e.g., Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.. 987 F,2d 939. 950-51 (3d Cir. 1993) (Roth. J.. dis-
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constructed and conducted survey provides the most direct evidence of
that fact. Allowing a court to substitute its judgment for such direct evidence of consumer reactions may increase error costs and the uncertainty
that can chill truthful speech.2"
These possible negative effects of this article's proposal, however,
may not be as severe as first appears. Reliance on consumer surveys does
not guarantee a predictable or accurate result. The probative value of a
consumer survey is a highly fact-specific determination. The objectivity of
a survey depends on a variety of factors: "properly defining the 'universe'
of the survey; a representative sampling of individuals from that universe;
sound interviewing procedures; questions framed in a clear, precise, and
non-leading manner; and data accurately reported and analyzed."' " No
survey is completely objective and reliable."as Accordingly, litigants routinely challenge survey evidence. Thus, even under current law, no party
can be entirely confident that a court will find that its survey supports its
advertised claim. In any event, this article recommends eliminating the
requirement of consumer survey evidence; it does not recommend prohibiting courts from considering such evidence. Parties would still be free to
conduct and submit consumer surveys. If the message conveyed by an
advertisement is unclear, parties still would be well advised to present
consumer survey evidence2 6 The proposal merely would eliminate the
conclusive presumption that surveys are needed whenever an advertisement is literally true. Like the FTC, 227 a court only would require the use
of extrinsic evidence when it was unsure of the message conveyed by a
challenged advertisement.
The unwillingness to allow judges to interpret advertisements for
themselves demeans judicial expertise and experience. Courts are welltrained in interpreting language and its effects. Contract interpretation and
statutory construction regularly require judges to finely parse language. In
the field of libel, "trial courts have a significant role in establishing the
'
meaning of challenged communications."228
In trademark cases under

senting); Sandoz Pharmaceuticals. 902 F.2d at 229.
223. See Kraft. Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311. 327-28 (7th Cir. 1992) (Manion, J.. concurring); Best.
supra note 8, at 58.
224. Rhone-Poulenc, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1016, at *30.
225. See, e.g., Castrol, 987 F.2d at 952-53 (Roth, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge stated that
the survey evidence suggested that consumers did not extract even the literal meaning of the challenged advertisement. See id. at 953.
226. Thus, the cost-saving produced by this article's proposal would inure disproportionately to
plaintiffs with the clearest cases of misrepresentation-precisely the type of cases the law should seek
to encourage.
227. See Kraft, 970 F.2d at 315-16, 318.
228. Best, supra note 8, at 43 (stating that the court determines whether words are reasonably
capable of or demand a particular interpretation and decides whether the meaning of the communica-
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section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, courts routinely find a likelihood of
confusion without considering survey evidence. 2 9 In advertising cases
involving the FTC, the judicial system reviews, albeit deferentially, the
agency's findings of fact concerning an advertisement's message.
The FTC's purported expertise 2 3 cannot justify denying courts the
power of interpretation that is granted to the FTC. False advertising cases
comprise only a small part of the FTC's workload. Moreover, FTC
Commissioners' average tenure is only four years, and most have had little
prior experience in advertising.
More importantly, the relevant
question in false advertising litigation is the nonexperts' view of the message conveyed by the challenged advertisement. A jury would seem to be
better equipped than five expert Commissioners to decide that issue. In
any event, whatever errors a judge or jury makes in interpreting the effects
of the challenged advertisement might be more than offset by the errors
survey failures now produce. 2
In an ideal world with perfect and cost-free information, consumer
surveys should be required in every case. However, the world is not perfect, and information is not cost-free. Decreasing reliance on consumer
surveys and limiting their use to cases in which implied messages are not
clear would reduce litigation costs and, contrary to prevailing wisdom,
may even lead to more accurate judgments.
VII. CONCLUSION
False advertising deprives the public of information that is necessary
for the proper working of a free market. It harms the economic interests of
consumers and competitors and undermines the moral and ethical standards of society. No one questions that false advertising may be invidious
and damaging. Rather, the dispute concerns the extent to which false advertising poses a substantial threat to society and whether competitor lawsuits can cost-effectively reduce that threat.
Recent critics of competitor actions have suggested that false advertising presents a de minimis harm to the public, and competitor actions are
more likely to have anticompetitive effects than to improve consumer
welfare. They view the free-market as capable of self-correcting any distortions created by false advertising. Critics argue that consumers are able
to detect and punish misrepresentations and disbelieve claims they cannot

tion is defamatory).
229. See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY. TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23.20. at 23-132

to -133 (3d ed. 1992).
230.

See. e.g., Kraft. 970 F.2d at 316: Sandoz Pharmaceuticals, 902 F.2d at 228.

231. See Kraft, 970 F.2d at 319.
232. See supra notes 214-19, 224-25 and accompanying text.
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verify. They further argue that although some false advertising exists, it is
as inevitable as industrial accidents are to the manufacturing process. They
thus assert that falsehoods can be eliminated only by ceasing communication just as accidents can be avoided only by ceasing production. Neither result recommends itself to the critics. In short, they conclude that
competitor suits for false advertising results in costly overdeterrence. a
This article has argued that the critics of competitor actions for false
advertising have overestimated the ability of the market to self-correct and
have overstated the costs imposed by competitor suits. Consumers cannot
always detect falsehoods and do not always punish deceptions that they
discover. Consumer skepticism offers some protection against the effects
of false advertising, but does not provide the level of protection accorded
to it by the critics of competitor suits. The critics also mistakenly assume
that most, if not all defendants, act in good faith,' an assumption that
distorts their analysis of the costs of competitor enforcement of section
43(a). 5 Their suggestion of a negligence or intent standard for liability 6 would also introduce its own unpredictability and guarantee difficult
and costly litigation issues.
The review of the reported cases during the last ten years supports this
article's position. Contrary to the critics' assumptions, many defendants
knowingly stretched the truth, or lied outright. Moreover, competitors were
in the best position to detect the deception and bring suit in virtually all
cases because most involved credence claims not easily verified by consumers. When plaintiffs prevailed, the falsehood almost always was material, and damages were rarely granted. Without injunctive relief, advertisers would have had the incentive to engage in further deception. Few
competitor cases illustrated the types of costs feared by the critics. Thus,
little empirical evidence exists that proves competitor suits for false advertising result in overdeterrence. In fact, most evidence points to the contrary conclusion.
Admittedly, competitor suits for false advertising create costs. But
only in the economist's fantasy land does competitor enforcement of the
false advertising laws fail to provide substantial benefits. Competitor suits
can greatly, enhance consumer welfare and further some of the

233. See BeVier, supra note 7, at 30-31; Singdablsen, supra note 8, at 340-42. 394-95.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
235. The critics also give insufficient weight to the effect of the limited availability of damage
awards on the competitor's risk calculus. Even if advertisers acted in good faith, given the prevalence
of injunctive relief only, the appropriate analogy might not be to liability for industrial accidents, but
to the contract principle of mutual mistake of fact. When there is a mutual mistake of fact, no damages
are awarded for breach, but the contract is unenforceable and it would be improper for one of the
parties to make the same representation of fact in the future.
236. See. e.g.. BeVier, supra note 7. at 30-31; Singdahlsen, supra note 8, at 340-42, 394-95.
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nonquantifiable interests that critics fail to acknowledge. These benefits
include interests in fair treatment, ethical and moral standards, and compensation for victims. In any event, this article indicates how the costbenefit analysis could be further tilted in favor of competitor actions. By
freely awarding attorneys fees to prevailing parties and permitting courts
to find implied deception without the use of consumer surveys, the potential costs of competitor suits can be reduced without sacrificing any of the
benefits of competitor enforcement.
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C. Cases Defendant Won (18 total)-3, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18, 22, 23,
28, 29, 30, 36, 37, 42, 46, 53
D. Undecided Cases (7 total)-12, 16, 33, 39, 48, 50, 56
E. Cases Making Comparative Claims (43 total, with 23 making explicit
(e) comparative claims)-, 2, 3, 4(e), 6(e), 7(e), 9, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15(e), 16, 17, 19(e), 20(e), 21(e), 22(e), 25(e), 27(e), 28(e), 32, 33, 35,
36(e), 37, 38(e), 39, 40, 41(e), 42(e), 43, 44(e), 45(e), 46(e), 48(e), 50,
53, 55, 56(e), 57(e), 59(e), 60(e)
F. Cases With Larger PlaintiffAnd New Entrant Defendant (12 total, 2
won by defendant (d))-4, 5, 11 (d), 14, 30(d), 35, 40, 44, 45, 49, 57,
60
G. Damages Sought (24 total, with 5 awards (a), of which 2 awards were
remanded (ar) for proof of the amount of plaintiff's injury)-, 3, 5(a),
8, 9(ar), 12, 16, 17, 18, 19(a), 26, 27, 30, 33, 34(ar), 35(a), 39, 43, 47,
48, 50, 53, 57, 58
H. Good Faith (22 total)-2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 18, 20, 22, 23, 26, 28,
29, 30, 36, 37, 41, 46, 53, 55, 57
I.

QuestionableFaith (at least in part) (34 total)-l, 3, 4, 5. 6, 9 (counterclaim), 13, 14, 17, 19, 21, 24, 25, 27, 31, 32, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40,
42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 58, 59, 60

J. Insufficient Facts to Determine if in Good Faith (5 total)-12, 16, 33,
52, 56
K. Noncompetitor PlaintiffAvailable (15 total, of which 8 probably had
insufficient stake to sue (?))-3, 10, 11(?), 28(?), 30, 31, 33(?), 34(?),
39, 40(?), 43(?), 44(?), 54(?), 56, 57
L. Credence Claim (48 total, of which 14 do not concern credence attribute (c))-l, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7(c), 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15(c), 16, 17, 18(c),
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19(c), 20(c), 21(c), 22, 23, 24, 25, 26. 27, 29, 32, 35, 36, 37(c), 38(c),
39(c), 41, 42(c), 43(c), 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53(c), 54(c). 55,
58, 59(c), 60
M. Not Material (3 total-those not listed were material)-18, 36, 52
N. Last Reported Opinion Is Preliminary Injunction Decision (27 total)-2, 4, 11, 13, 14, 15. 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 32, 37,
38, 40. 41, 45, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55, 59
0. Final Judgment Entered Before Trial (5 total)-3, 8, 10, 30, 53
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